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Summary 
 
Policymakers need to be aware of the risk of extreme events such as recessions and banking 
crises.  Given the future is uncertain, monetary policy makers need to consider the full range of 
risks around their forecasts when considering policy, including the probability of recession.  
Financial stability policy makers are by definition concerned with low probability events that 
could lead to banking crises.   
 
The recent banking crisis and recession have raised the question of how closely the two events 
are linked, and whether a consideration of such interlinkages could have helped forecast these 
events better.  There is a wide array of previous work that has considered ways to predict either 
banking crises or recessions; this paper considers whether estimating both together and allowing 
for interlinkages between the two events improves modelling performance.  
 
Tests suggest there is evidence for correlation between banking crises and recessions, but this is 
the result of common observable causes rather than direct causal links.  The probability that a 
country will be in recession is much higher in the year after a banking crisis than is normally the 
case.  But, after accounting for external indicators, a bivariate probit model (which jointly 
estimates the probability of two correlated, separate discrete events) finds no evidence of 
correlation between banking crises and recessions.  On the basis of previous work, this paper 
looks at an array of possible indicators of both banking crises and recession.  Using a pooled 
sample of data since 1981 for fourteen advanced economies, including the United Kingdom, 
France, Germany and the United States, this paper finds that banking sector capital ratios, the 
deviation of the credit-to-GDP ratio from trend and the current account deficit are useful 
predictors of banking crises.  The first principal component (a summary statistic of common 
trends in a selection of variables) derived from OECD leading indicators of GDP growth helps 
predict recessions, as do movements in real house and equity price inflation, and the current 
account deficit.   
 
Like all forecasting models, the model presented here is prone to mistakes – tending to over-
predict recessions and banking crises.  In the period over which the model is estimated – 1981-
2005 – up to three-quarters of the model’s year-ahead predictions of recession were false alarms, 
while up to 90% of the predictions that a banking crises will occur were incorrect.  The model’s 
out-of-sample performance (post-2005) is substantially better, but this indicates how unusual the 
past few years are, and is consistent with tests which suggest some model coefficients changed 
after 2005 (possibly reflecting the fact that increased global financial and trade inter-linkages 
increased the risk of banking crises and recessions in all countries through contagion).   
 
Even though the precise model predictions are imperfect, the model does still provide 
policymakers with useful information.  For example, the model points to the increased risk of a 
banking crisis in the United Kingdom in the mid-to-late 2000s and that this risk was higher than 
for many other advanced economies.  The model also corroborates the risk of a contraction in 
2009 but probably identifies it no earlier than did forecasters using existing techniques.  It may 
therefore be a useful tool to include in the suite of indicators used by policymakers.  
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1  Introduction 
 
The banking crisis that gathered force after the failure of Northern Rock and reached its 
maximum intensity in the aftermath of the failure of Lehman Brothers was largely 
unanticipated.  Equally it is fair to say that the recession that began in 2008 but did not appear in 
annual data until 2009 was largely unforeseen.  Inevitably, after such an experience people 
wonder how closely banking crises and recessions are linked, and whether a consideration of 
such interlinkages could have helped forecast these events better.   
 
In this paper we bring together two hitherto separate strands of work; the first looks at the ability 
of a range of indicators to predict banking crises, and the second looks at the role of leading 
indicators of recessions.  It is widely suggested that there is some relationship between banking 
crises and recessions.  A casual examination of the incidence of banking crises and recessions 
suggests they often cluster together; in some cases occurring in the same year, in other cases 
recession occur shortly after banking crises or vice versa (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Incidence of banking crises and recessions
 (a)(b) 
 
(a) Recession defined as a fall in the level of real GDP relative to the previous calendar year. 
(b) Incidents of banking crises taken from Barrell et al (2010).  
 
If banking crises and recessions are interdependent, then one might expect that a joint analysis 
of the two could improve the capacity to predict both events.  We first assess whether there is 
evidence for interdependency between recessions and banking crises using both non-parametric 
tests and unconditional bivariate probit models.  We find strong evidence for interdependence.  
We then consider whether leading indicators can help predict banking crises and recessions and 
if these variables can explain the previously observed interdependence.  We find that several 
leading indicators commonly used in the literature can help predict banking crises and 
recessions, and that one – the change in the current account balance – has predictive power for 
both banking crises and recessions.  Once these exogenous variables are included we find no 
residual correlation between banking crises and recessions – indicating that the observed 
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We begin this paper by reviewing the literature on predicting crises and recessions using 
indicator variables.  In section 3 we then discuss our data, while in section 4 we present 
unconditional analysis of the relationship between banking crises and recessions.  Section 5 
presents conditional indicator models of both events estimated jointly for the period from 1981 
to 2005 across a range of OECD countries.  In section 6 we review their performance out of 
sample as tools to predict the banking crises and recessions of 2008/9.  We also examine the 
effect of using different thresholds to differentiate predicted outcomes (ie how strong a signal is 
required before a policymaker should anticipate a recession or banking crises). 
 
2  Leading indicators of banking crises and recessions 
 
Banking crises are discrete events and work on assessing the capacity of indicators to anticipate 
them is, not surprisingly, structured around logit or probit analysis.  Recessions are similarly 
discrete events but there is a question whether they are better forecast in a similar probit 
framework or whether it is better to work from a linear or non-linear framework for forecasting 
output growth.  
 
The first systematic set of current and leading indicators of the state of an economy was 
developed by Burns and Mitchell (1946) for the United States.  Their focus was on identifying 
turning points in the economy cycle, possibly because at the time of their study national 
accounts were in their infancy and there were not, therefore, any generally agreed and 
understood high-frequency continuous variables, such as real GDP, indicating economic 
activity.  However, in the decades since their work, many researchers have continued to focus 
on the question of identifying turning points in the economy cycle as distinct from the question 
of predicting movements in GDP.  The OECD, for example, continues to produce leading 
indicators for its member states, which are not intended to predict movements in real GDP but 
are intended to identify turning points in the economic cycle.  
 
Marcellino (2006) illustrates the ability of this index together with two other leading indicators 
for the United States, those produced by the Conference Board and the Economic Cycle 
Research Institute (ECRI) to anticipate the start and the end of recessions as identified by the 
National Bureau of Economic Research.  He notes that the indicators anticipate the beginnings 
of recessions by about nine to ten months, with the Conference Board indicator showing a 
similar lead ahead of the ends of recessions but the OECD and  ECRI indicators indicating the 
ends of recessions with  leads of only three to four months.  Marcellino notes, however, that all 
these indices are calculated with the benefit of hindsight; his analysis is therefore indicative of 
performance in-sample rather than a good indication of how well the indicators might operate in 
real time.  Camba-Mendez, Kapetanios, Smith and Weale (2002) suggested that, for France, 
Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, the OECD leading indicators in real time did not have 
the ability to contribute significantly to predictions of GDP growth; they did not explore, 
however, their ability to predict cyclical turning points.  
 
The OECD indicator is produced by detrending each of its components, dividing each by its 
standard deviation and then taking the arithmetic mean.  However an alternative approach, due 
to Rhodes (1937), involves the use of the first principal component as a summary a group of  
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indicator variables.  Stock and Watson (2002) set out the statistical properties of such an 
indicator when some of the variables in question are stationary and others include unit roots.  
Obviously the principal component can be used instead of the composite indicator produced by 
any of the above bodies as an explanatory variable in an equation designed to explain either the 
risk of a banking crisis or the risk of a recession.   
 
A range of other authors have looked at the ability of leading indicators to anticipate either 
recessions or turning points using probit or logit models.  Studies include Estrella and Mishkin 
(1997) and Birchenhall, Jensen, Osborn and Simpson (1999); little further work has, however, 
been published on the topic since the start of the current century.  
 
Studies of the predictability of banking crises have used a similar structure (ie probit and logit 
models), but have used a range of indicator variables instead of giving a role to composite 
leading indicators.  Bell and Pain (2000) provide a summary of much of the literature following 
the Asian banking crises and outline several theoretical explanations for banking crises.   
 
As banks are likely to face financial difficulty when the value of their assets falls relative to their 
liabilities any shocks that affect the probability of default of a large number of borrowers or lead 
to dislocation in asset markets are likely to be associated with bank distress.  If banks do not 
correctly measure their exposure to interest rate risk and hedge themselves accordingly then 
shocks to the yield curve can also lead to wide-scale banking sector problems (as happened in 
the case of Savings and Loans institutions in the United States in the 1980s).  This suggests that 
measures of output, employment and interest rates may help predict banking crises, while 
banking sector capital ratios should indicate the general vulnerability of the banking system to 
shocks.  High inflation has also been suggested as a factor behind banking sector failures as it 
has the potential to depress the real interest rate, increasing the demand for borrowing and 
potentially making it harder for banks to sift out riskier borrowers.  High inflation can also be 
associated with increased economic uncertainty if accompanied by large relative price changes.   
 
Lending booms can alter the short-term probability of success of some investments, as 
borrowers bid up the price of, for example, land and properties and the resulting increase in 
wealth raises aggregate demand.  This process can make it harder for banks to assess which 
projects have a poor long-term chance of success and can leave banks more vulnerable to 
deterioration in the health of their borrowers.  Credit growth and property prices are therefore 
often included in models of banking crises.  For example, Schularick and Taylor (2009) use data 
for 14 advanced economies back to the 1870s and find that credit growth relative to GDP is a 
strong predictor of financial crises. 
 
In addition to the risk of insolvency, banks are also exposed to liquidity risk.  If depositors fear 
that other depositors will withdraw their savings and make a bank illiquid then they may also 
withdraw their savings leading to a bank run (Diamond and Dybvig (1983)).  This coordination 
failure can be overcome through deposit insurance (which negates the risk that one depositor 
will lose money if the other depositors withdrawals make a bank illiquid), but if the premia 
charged to banks do not accurately reflect the riskiness of their portfolios then this can lead them 
to price risk incorrectly, increasing the vulnerability of the banking system.  The risk of bank  
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runs may be heightened if banks share common business models.  If one bank fails as a result of 
an idiosyncratic shock, then depositors may withdraw funds from other banks they perceive as 
similar, if information asymmetries mean they are unable to tell whether the original shock was 
truly idiosyncratic.  Contagion can also arise through direct exposures, either because banks 
suffer credit losses on interbank loans or because uncertainty about interbank exposures leads to 
an effective closure of interbank markets as banks try to reduce their exposure to suspect banks.  
This suggests that indicators of low banking sector liquidity, similarity in the structures of 
banks’ loan books, and linkages between banks may be good indicators of increased 
vulnerability to crises. 
 
Barrell et al (2010a) suggest that current account deficits may increase the risk of banking crises 
through their influence on some of the triggers discussed above.  The monetary inflows that 
accompany deficits may enable banks to expand credit excessively, while potentially exposing 
them to volatile international wholesale markets.  Such excess lending may lead to an 
overheating economy and unsustainable rises in asset prices.  
 
Aside from the possible combination of vulnerabilities and triggers outlined above, some papers 
(eg Azariadis (1981), and Cass and Shell (1983)) suggest that some self-fulfilling bank runs can 
occur because of random trigger events.  Such banking crises would be unpredictable and would 
suggest there is some residual probability of banking crises even after all identifiable 
vulnerabilities and trigger events are accounted for.   
 
While there are papers that have previously considered the links between banking and currency 
crises (eg Falcetti and Tudela (2008)) we have not identified other work that considers the 
interdependence between bank crises and recessions.  
 
3  Data and Methodology 
 
Data on banking crises are taken from Barrell et al (2010a), which are themselves mainly 
sourced from the World Bank database of banking crises and the IMF Financial Crisis Episode 
database.  The full dataset of crises used in this study is shown in Figure 2.  We define 
recessions as years in which real GDP falls relative to the previous year.  This definition was 
chosen to match our use of annual data in the model, at the cost of omitting some periods of 
quarterly recession from the sample
(1). 
 
We restrict our analysis to fourteen OECD countries for which there are suitable data.  Previous 
work has suggested that banking crises in developed economies have determinants distinct from 
those of emerging and developing economies (eg Barrell et al (2009) and (2010b)) and we 
wished to focus on the policy implications for developed economies. 
 
Between 1981 and 2009 there were 20 banking crises (including nine classified as systemic) and 
47 cases of year-on-year falls in output.  
 
                                                 
(1) Of course two successive years with falling output could be regarded as a single recession.  
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Figure 2: List of systemic and non-systemic banking crises 
 
 
Source: Barrell et al (2010a). 
 
We use a bivariate probit model, a generalisation of the standard probit model that allows for 
correlation between outcomes to be jointly estimated.  We set    
   1  if there is a banking crisis 
and    
   0  otherwise; and    
   1  if output falls in country i in year t and    
   0   if it does not.  
The general specification of our bivariate model is: 
 
                   ∑         
   
    ∑         
   
         ,     
   1  if yit > 0, 0 otherwise 
 
                   ∑         
   
    ∑         
   
         ,     
   1   if zit > 0, 0 otherwise 
 
where  
    
    




 1    
 
Based on the literature discussed above we included macroeconomic and banking sector 
variables as potential exogenous indicators of both banking crises and recessions.  We include 
banking sector capital and liquidity ratios,  house and equity price growth deflated by growth in 
the private consumption deflator, a measure of credit relative to GDP, the current account to 
GDP ratio and the first principal component indicator taken from an array of predictors used in 
the OECD’s composite leading indicator.   
 
Banks’ capital adequacy (the ratio of capital and reserves for all banks over the end of year total 
of the balance sheet) was taken from the OECD Bank Income and Balance Sheet database.  
Liquidity data were sourced from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics Database; liquid 
assets were defined as a sum of banks’ claims on general government and the central bank, 
while total assets comprise foreign assets, claims on general government, central bank and 
1 Banking crisis
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private sector.  Data on house prices, equity prices and credit were taken from Goodhart and 
Hofmann (2008).
(2)   
 
Following Borio and Drehmann (2009) we use deviations in the credit-to-GDP ratio from a 
trend measured using a Hodrick-Prescott filter.  The series was calculated for each year 
recursively using the data up to that year in order to provide a measure of the deviation of the 
credit-to-GDP ratio from the underlying trend. 
 
The principal component index was calculated using the first principal component of the leading 
indicators used in the OECD composite leading indicator index.  The indicator was restricted to 
the selection of variables included in the OECD’s indices in 2005 (to avoid introducing bias into 
the out-of-sample test conducted on the post-2005 data), although the factor loadings were 
estimated on data up to 2008.  As not all the component series were available back to 1980 (the 
start of the estimation period) the first principal component was estimated using a modified 
methodology that could incorporate an unbalanced dataset.  An EM algorithm was used to 
achieve this.  The algorithm used the assumed factor structure to estimate factors and missing 
observations iteratively until both factor and missing observation estimates converged over the 
iterations.
(3)   
 
4  Unconditional analysis of the relationship between banking crises and recessions 
 
Basic non-parametric analysis suggests that the broad conclusion taken from Figure 1 – that 
banking crises and recessions are correlated – is true.  Table 1 shows that the probability of a 
recession if a banking crisis occurred in the previous year is 25%, three times higher than the 
unconditional probability.  The difference is even greater for systemic banking crises (Table 2).  
Fisher exact tests indicate that there is an association between banking crises and recessions at 
the 10% significance level both contemporaneously and with recessions following banking 
crises with a one year lag. 
 
Table 1: Occurrences of recessions in year 
after banking crises (1980-2005) 
Table 2: Occurrences of recessions in the 
year after systemic banking crises (1980-
2005) 
 
  Banking crisis in 
previous year 
No Yes  Total
Recession 
No 311  9  320 
Yes 27  3  30 
Total 338  12  350 
Probability of recession 8.0%  25.0% 8.6%
 Systemic  banking 
crisis in previous year
No Yes Total 
Recession 
No 317  3 320 
Yes 28 2  30 
Total 345  5  350 
Probability of 
banking crisis 
8.1% 40.0%  8.6% 
 
In addition to these non-parametric tests, we ran simple bivariate probit regressions for all 
banking crises and recessions estimated with only lagged incidences of banking crises and 
                                                 
(2) The authors would like to thank Charles Goodhart and Boris Hofmann for permission to use the data and to thank 
Adam Posen, Neil Meads and Tomas Hellebrandt who provided data to extend the dataset to 2009. 
(3) The authors would like to thank George Kapetanios for his help in estimating the first principal component 
indices.  
 
External MPC Unit Discussion Paper No. 33 September 2011 10
recessions (ie without any of the exogenous variable used subsequently).  The equation was 
estimated only up to 2005 to exclude the effects of the recent crises and recessions.  If there is a 
causal link between recessions and banking crises the coefficients on lagged values of the 
dependent variables and/or the covariance term (ρ) should be non-zero.   
 
Equation 1: Bivariate probit model of recessions and all banking crises  
   Coefficient Standard error z  P>|z|
All banking crises    
Banking crisist-1 -4.52 2.17x10
3 0.00 1.00
Recessiont-1 0.40 0.37 1.09  0.28
Constant -1.85 0.14 -13.29  0.00
Recessions        
Banking crisist-1 0.59 0.43 1.39  0.16
Recessiont-1 0.75 0.26 2.83  0.01
Constant -1.51 0.11 -13.79  0.00
ρ 0.35 0.18 0  0.065
        
Number of observations:  350 Log likelihood:  -147.04
Sample period:  1981-2005  
 
The result (Equation 1) suggests that the covariance in the error terms of the two equations is 
significant at the 10% level, and that past occurrences of recessions may help predict recessions 
in the current year.  The standard errors of the coefficient suggest that that recessions can help 
predict recessions, but systemic banking crises do not help predict further crises or recessions. 
 
Similar results hold if attention is restricted to systemic banking crises (Equation 2).  The 
standard errors of the coefficient suggest that that recessions can help predict recessions, but 
systemic banking crises do not help predict further crises or recessions.  Nevertheless, there is 
once again a marked element of simultaneity as shown by the value of ρ. 
 
Equation 2: Bivariate probit model of recessions and systemic banking crises 
   Coefficient Standard error z  P>|z|
Systemic banking crises        




Constant -2.15 0.18 -12.15  0.00
Recessions    
Banking crisist-1 0.92 0.62 1.47  0.14
Recessiont-1 0.72 0.27 2.68  0.01
Constant -1.49 0.11 -13.86  0.00
ρ 0.50 0.21   0.03
        
Number of observations:    350 Log likelihood:  -120.59
Sample period:  1981-2005  
 
The highly negative (if statistically insignificant) coefficients on some of the lagged dependent 
variables in the banking crises and systemic banking crises equations imply that there is 
negligible chance for there to be banking crises in two successive years.  This reflects the fact  
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that (as Figure 2 shows) there were no banking crises in a year immediately following a crisis in 
our sample of countries pre 2006.  But the banking crises in the United Kingdom and United 
States of America in 2008 and 2009 highlight that this conclusion is faulty.  This, of course, 
reflects the general problem of drawing inferences from relatively small samples of data.    
 
5  Indicator models of banking crises and recessions 
 
While these results suggest there is a causal link from banking crises to recessions, this could be 
a consequence of identifiable underlying causes rather than unobservable variables.  As 
discussed in the methodology section, alongside lagged occurrences of banking crises and 
recessions we also tested for the effect of real house and equity price inflation, current account 
deficits as a proportion of GDP, the first principal component of OECD leading indicators of 
GDP growth, banking sector liquidity and banking sector capital ratios.  Using annual data 
between 1980 and 2005, we estimated a bivariate probit model with the lags of all of these 
variables.  There was evidence that lags of up to three years were statistically significant.  But 
the economic rationale for such lags was unclear and could itself be evidence of overfitting.  We 
therefore restricted our model to use only one-year lags of the available variables.  Variables 
were then eliminated one at a time; removing the least significant macroeconomic indicators 
first and then the least significant banking sector indicators, until only those variables significant 
at the 10% level remained.
(4)   
 
The resulting model (Equation 3) indicates that a low bank capital ratio and a high credit-to-
GDP ratio relative to trend both increase the probability of a banking crisis, as does a high 
current account deficit.  However, house and equity prices and cyclical indicators do not appear 
to be significant predictors of banking crises.  
 
Equation 3: Bivariate probit model of banking crises and recessions  
   Coefficient Standard error z P>|z| 
Banking crises        
Capitalt-1 -0.10 0.06 -1.64  0.10
Credit to GDP ratio gapt-1 0.13 0.04 3.20  0.00
Current account as % GDPt-1 -0.13 0.06 -2.06  0.04
Constant -1.49 0.33 -4.57  0.00
Recession   
First principal componentt-1 -0.23 0.10 -2.44  0.02
Real house price inflationt-1 -0.06 0.02 -2.53  0.01
Real equity price inflationt-1 -0.03 0.01 -3.37  0.00
Current account as % GDPt-1 -0.13 0.05 -2.70  0.01
Constant -1.82 0.19 -9.43  0.00
ρ -0.020 0.313   0.95
        
Number of observations:   347 Log likelihood:  -100.76
Sample period:  1981-2005  
 
                                                 
(4) The first run of the equation with all variables is shown in Appendix 1.  
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The leading indicators of GDP growth can help predict a recession now even though the 
indicators are taken from the previous year.  Low or negative real house and equity price 
inflation both foreshadow recessions, as does a high current account deficit.   
 
In both equations the constant term was statistically significant at each stage of the process of 
estimation.  This contrasts with the findings of Barrell et al (2010b); they imposed the restriction 
that the constant term in their banking crises equation was zero so that the mean risk of a crisis 
was explained by the mean values of the explanatory variables.  
 
The results also show that the covariance between error terms in the estimates for recessions and 
banking crises disappears when these other, previously omitted, variables are included.  This 
indicates that the observed correlation between banking crises and recessions shown by 
Equation 1 is the result of identifiable underlying causes.   
 
To estimate the bivariate model for systemic banking crises and recessions, we took the model 
for all banking crises and re-estimated for the sub-sample of systemic crises.  The initial result 
for the sub-group of crises suggested that the capital ratio and current account were not 
statistically significant predictors of systemic banking crises: only the credit-to-GDP is 
statistically significant alongside the constant term (Equation 4).  In addition the constant term is 
more negative than for all banking crises, possibly reflecting the lower probability of systemic 
banking crises.   
 
Equation 4: Bivariate probit model of systemic banking crises and recessions  
   Coefficient 
Standard 
error z P>|z| 
Banking crises 
Credit to GDP ratio gapt-1 0.10 0.05 2.07 0.04 
Constant -2.33 0.23 -10.32 0.00 
Recession 
First principal componentt-1 -0.25 0.10 -2.61 0.01 
Real house price inflationt-1 -0.06 0.02 -2.57 0.01 
Real equity price inflationt-1 -0.03 0.01 -3.32 0.00 
Current account as % GDPt-1 -0.13 0.05 -2.50 0.01 
Constant -1.80 0.18 -9.77 0.00 
ρ 0.69 0.48 0.17 
Number of observations:  347 Log likelihood:  -80.32 
Sample period:  1981-2005  
 
Equation 3 includes a measure of the leverage of the banking sector, but not liquidity.  Equation 
4 includes neither measure.  In both equations, the deviation of the credit-to-GDP ratio from its 
long-run trend is significant.  The marginal significance of the capital term in the equation for all 
banking crises is consistent with recent work by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(2010), which suggests that that leverage ratios of individual banks are poor indicators of 
impending severe bank stress or failure.    
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5.1  Diagnostic checks 
In order to conduct diagnostic tests on our preferred regressions we calculated the generalised 
residuals of the equations given by Gourieroux et al (1987).  The residuals for each equation 
were calculated separately (given the covariance between the error terms in the two equations is 
not statistically significantly different from zero).   
 
We use the test for cross-section dependence developed by Hsiao, Pesaran and Pick (2007) for 
non-linear panel models.  The CD-test statistic uses the pair-wise correlation coefficients of the 
residuals in the regression equations over the period 1981-2005 for the i
th and j
th countries, ρij, 
and is asymptotically normally distributed. 
 
CD    
2T
N N   1 
   ρ    
N
     
N  
   
  
 
The CD-test statistic for the banking crises equation is 0.87 and for systemic banking crises is 
1.5 – neither are statistically significantly different from zero.  The test statistic for the recession 
equation is 12.6 (12.8 when estimated alongside the systemic banking crisis equation) – 
significantly different from zero, suggesting that there is evidence of cross-sectional dependence 
and implying an omitted variable.  Attempts to remove this using country fixed effects and time 
dummies were unsuccessful.  Adding the unweighted yearly averages of all the exogenous 
variables to the regression also failed to correct for the cross-sectional correlation.  However, 
adding the proportion of countries in recession as an explanatory variable to the recession 
equation, as proposed by Mitchell, Smith and Weale (2011) following on from Pesaran (2006), 
did eliminate the cross-sectional dependence – reducing the recession equation test statistic to 
just 0.73.
















                                                 
(5) Predictions of recessions reported later in the paper are based on this equation, but the specification of the 
recession equation estimated alongside systemic banking crises is reported in Appendix 2 for information.  
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Equation 5: Bivariate probit model of banking crises and recessions including proportion of 
sample countries in recession 
   Coefficient  Standard error  Z  P>|z| 
Banking crises 
Capitalt-1 -0.10 0.06 -1.64  0.10
Credit to GDP ratio gapt-1 0.13 0.04 3.15  0.00
Current account as % GDPt-1 -0.13 0.06 -2.06  0.04
Constant -1.49 0.33 -4.56  0.00
Recession 
First principal componentt-1 -0.17 0.11 -1.46  0.15
Real house price inflationt-1 -0.05 0.03 -1.96  0.05
Real equity price inflationt-1 -0.04 0.01 -2.86  0.00
Current account as % GDPt-1 -0.11 0.06 -1.83  0.07
Proportion of sample in 
recessiont 3.81 0.75 5.08  0.00
Constant -2.53 0.31 -8.13  0.00
ρ -0.024 0.414 0.95
Number of observations:  347 Log likelihood:  -85.70
Sample period:  1981-2005  
 
Lagged values of the dependent variables were included at the first stage of the regression 
estimation process, together with country fixed effects, but both were dropped from the 
regression as part to the process of sequentially dropping variables that were not statistically 
significant.  As the final result of any process of elimination may depend on the path used, we 
ran some robustness checks – adding country fixed effects and lagged dependent variables back 
into the model.  Table 3 indicates confirms that these coefficients are not significant 
collectively. 
 
Table 3: Likelihood ratio tests on restrictions on removal of country fixed effects and lagged 
dependent variables 
  χ




Country fixed effects  20.20  (0.78) 
Lagged dependent variables  5.32  (0.26) 
Systemic 
banking crises 
Country fixed effects  26.43  (0.44) 
Lagged dependent variables  2.02  (0.73) 
 
As a further robustness check we looked for evidence of a structural break in the model after 
2005, by extending the estimation period up to 2008 and using a dummy variable interacting 
with the other model variables to test for changes in coefficients.  Table 4 indicates there is 
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Table 4: Likelihood ratio tests for structural break after 2005 
    χ





Structural break in either recession or banking crisis 
equation  40.52  (0.00) 
Structural break in banking crisis equation only  22.71  (0.00) 




Structural break in either recession or banking crisis 
equation  22.57  (0.00) 
Structural break in banking crisis equation only  6.63  (0.04) 
Structural break in recession crisis equation only  16.07  (0.01) 
 
An examination of the re-estimated models suggests that the structural break test for all banking 
crises is picking up a change in the coefficient of the deviation from the trend credit-to-GDP 
ratio.  The break in the equation for systemic banking crises probably reflects a change in the 
constant – perhaps reflecting the higher incidence of systemic banking crises in the three years 
after 2005.  The break in the equation of all banking crisis probably reflects a change in the 
coefficient on the credit to GDP gap term.  This may reflect the fact that a country’s own credit-
to-GDP ratio was less important than cross-border financial linkages to other stricken banking 
systems in determining the probability of financial crises.  The break in the recession equation 
reflects a change in the coefficient on the current account surplus.  This may reflect that trade 
linkages meant that countries with significant trade surpluses also experienced recessions as 
demand in deficit countries fell sharply.  
 
6  Predictive power 
 
When assessing the usefulness of a predictive model of banking crises and recessions, an 
important factor is the choice of threshold used to determine a positive prediction for an event.  
Table 5 to Table 7 show the in-sample and out-of-sample performance of our preferred models 
of recessions and banking crises.   
 
All forecasting models are prone to error and ours are no exception: depending on the threshold 
used our models can give a substantial number of false positive predictions.  Using the 
proportion of crises or recessions in the period up to 2005 as the threshold, the model accurately 
predicts whether an economy will be in recession or not over 80% of the time (Table 5).  But the 
model is prone to over-predict recessions, with an in-sample probability incorrectly predicting a 
recession of around 75%.  Raising the threshold to twice the sample average or 50% prevented 
false predictions in-sample, but at the cost of failing to foresee a greater proportion of recessions 
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Table 5: Performance of model – sample average threshold  

























2009)  Predicted Actual 
i) 0  0 231  38 228 28 250 19 
ii) 1  0 87  0 107 20 92 33 
iii) 0  1 3  4 2 2 1 0 
i v )  1   1 2 6   1 4 1 0644  
Event correctly 
predicted
(a) 23%  100%  9% 23% 4% 11% 
Absence of event 
correctly predicted
(b) 99% 90% 99% 93%  100%  100% 
Kuipers  Score 0.62 0.78 0.51 0.33 0.53 0.37 
Matthews correlation 
coefficient 0.37 0.84 0.20 0.23 0.14 0.20 
(a) Probability of event correctly predicted given event is forecast = iv ÷ (ii + iv) 
(b) Probability of absence of event correctly predicted given absence of event is forecast = i ÷ (i + iii) 
 
 
Table 6: Performance of model – twice sample average threshold  


























2009)  Predicted Actual 
i) 0  0 256  38 302 36 322 33 
i i )  1   06 2   03 3 1 22 0 1 9  
iii) 0  1 6  4 6 5 4 4 
iv) 1  1 23  14 6 3 1 0 
Event correctly 
predicted
(a) 27% 100% 15%  20%  4%  0% 
Absence of event 
correctly predicted
(b) 98% 90% 98% 88% 99% 89% 
Kuipers  Score 0.60 0.78 0.40 0.13 0.14 -0.35 
Matthews correlation 
coefficient 0.38 0.84 0.23 0.10 0.07 -0.19 
(a) Probability of event correctly predicted given event is forecast = iv ÷ (ii + iv) 
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Table 7: Performance of model – 50% threshold  

























2009)  Predicted Actual 
i) 0  0 310  38 334 45 342 52 
i i )  1   08   01300  
iii) 0  1 19  15 12854  
i v )  1   1 1 0   30000  
Event correctly 
predicted
(a) 56%  100%  0% 0% 0% 0% 
Absence of event 
correctly predicted
(b) 94% 72% 97% 85% 99% 93% 
Kuipers  Score 0.32 0.17 0.00 -0.06 0.00 0.00 
Matthews correlation 
coefficient 0.40 0.35 -0.01  -0.10 N/A N/A 
(a) Probability of event correctly predicted given event is forecast = iv ÷ (ii + iv) 
(b) Probability of absence of event correctly predicted given absence of event is forecast = i ÷ (i + iii) 
 
The recession equation includes the contemporaneous proportion of the sample in recession, so 
predictions are made using an iterative process.  An initial prediction of the proportion of the 
sample in recession is made using Equation 3.  This first iteration is then fed into Equation 5 
alongside the lagged exogenous data to provide a new estimate of the countries in recession.  
This process is repeated until the prediction of the countries in recession that is fed into the 
model is the same as the prediction coming from the model.  This process can be thought of as 
analogous to the dynamic simulation of a time-series model.  
 
If instead we take the proportion of countries with recessions as exogenous to the model – 
analogous to the static simulation of a time-series model – the resulting in-sample fit of the 
regression equation is much improved.  For example, if we use the sample average as a 
threshold, the probability of correct prediction rises from 23% to 41% in sample but falls from 
100% to 93.3% out of sample.  
 
The tables also include the Kuipers Score and the Matthews Correlation Coefficient.  As 
Cipollini and Kapetanios (2009) note, both these measures combine all the information 
contained in the upper parts of the table into a single value.  The Kuipers score is defined as the 
difference between the proportion of events that were correctly forecasted (ie row iv divided by 
the sum of rows iv and iii) and the proportion of non-events that were incorrectly forecasted (ie 
row ii divided by rows i and ii).  The Matthews correlation coefficient is the correlation 
coefficient between the forecast and actual outcomes.
(6)  For both measures a positive value 
indicates an improvement relative to a naive predictor such as the sample average occurrence.  
The results show that our models outperform a naive predictor, unless a very high threshold is 
used to indicate a banking crisis (Table 7). 
 
                                                 
(6) Mathematically this can be written     
               
                                .  
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Out of sample, the model made over-predictions.  At the lowest threshold used (the 
unconditional sample probability of recession), the model failed to predict only one recession 
over the sample period of 1981-2005.  But the model failed to predict over a fifth of the 
recessions between 2006 and 2008.  This probably reflects the degree to which the past few 
years were unusual, with problems in banking systems in some countries leading to a 
synchronised recession across all the countries in the sample. 
 
An alternative assessment of the model is offered by exploring its ability to predict the recent 
banking crisis and recession in the some of the larger countries in the sample: the United 
Kingdom, France, Germany and the United States.  Chart 1 to Chart 4 shows the implied year-
ahead probabilities of an annual fall of GDP in these countries.  In all the countries the model 
correctly shows a sharp pick-up in the probability of recession in years when recessions 
occurred – particularly in 2009.  But the charts also show that there are occasions when the 
model gives a strong indication of a recession even when none occurs.  For example, in 1993 
there were recessions in eight of the fourteen countries in the sample.  This high proportion of 
recessions generates a high estimated probability of recession in other countries, such as the 
United Kingdom and United States.  
 
Chart 1: Year-ahead predictions of recession 
in the United Kingdom 
Chart 2: Year-ahead predictions of recession 
in France 



























1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
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Chart 3: Year-ahead predictions of recession 
in Germany 
Chart 4: Year-ahead predictions of recession 
in the United States 
(a) Shaded area denotes actual recession.  (a) Shaded area denotes actual recession. 
 
The fit of the equations for banking crises are significantly worse than that for recessions.  
Relative to the recession equation, the equations for banking crises had a lower probability of 
being correct overall (at around 70% when measured in sample with the sample proportion as a 
threshold), as the model regularly predicted banking crises when none occurred.  The probability 
of incorrectly forecasting a crisis when none occurred was over 90% when the unconditional 
sample probability was used as a threshold (Table 5).  Raising the threshold to twice the sample 
proportion reduced the probability of over-predicting crises, but the performance was still poor 
with over 85% of predictions of crises turning out to be inaccurate (Table 6).  If the threshold is 
raised to 50% then the model correctly predicts the outcome in over 90% of cases (ie the vast 
majority of years when there is no crises) but fails to predict any of the banking crises either in 
sample or out of sample (Table 7).   
 
The out out-of-sample performance of the model is substantially better, although the model is 
still more likely than not to make a false positive prediction of a banking crisis.  While the 
model failed to predict some banking crises, the model correctly spotted all four systemic 
banking crises out of sample when the sample average was used as a threshold.  The improved 
ability of the model to predict banking crises correctly after 2005 again highlights how unusual 
recent years have been and is consistent with our stability tests which suggested that some 
coefficients had changed after 2005.   
 
Given the difficulty in accurately predicting banking crises, the test of the model should not, 
perhaps, be whether it accurately predicts all outcomes, but whether it is a useful tool to assist 
policymakers interpret the data.  Chart 5 to Chart 8 show the year-ahead predictions of banking 
crises in the United Kingdom, France, Germany and the United States from our model.  Using 
the unconditional sample probability of a banking crisis across all countries would lead the 
model to indicate that a banking crisis was likely in the United Kingdom for the majority of the 
sample period.  This headline result suggests the model would have been of little use to 
policymakers except as offering a general and rather useful indication that the United Kingdom 
was a high-risk country.  But Chart 5 shows that the model did give a clear indication of the 
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in the mid-to-late 2000s.  The model also pointed to some slow pick-up in the risk of banking 
crises in France and the United States over the 2000s.  The model does, however, fail to point to 
any increase in risk in the German banking system in recent years.  Although the dataset does 
include the assets of Landesbanks, the failure to predict any of the recent problems in these 
banks may reflect the fact that problems in these banks generally arose from their exposure to 
cross-border investments rather than the domestic credit risks captured in our model.  This is a 
reminder that models of this type are a complement to rather than a substitute for a careful 
examination of the risks associated with individual banks. 
 
Chart 5: Year-ahead predictions of banking 
crises in the United Kingdom
(a) 
Chart 6: Year-ahead predictions of banking 
crises in France
(a) 
(a) Shaded area denotes actual banking crisis.  (a) Shaded area denotes actual banking crisis. 
 
 
Chart 7: Year-ahead predictions of banking 
crises in Germany
(a) 
Chart 8: Year-ahead predictions of banking 
crises in the United States
(a) 
(a) Shaded area denotes actual banking crisis.  (a) Shaded area denotes actual banking crisis. 
 
These results again highlight that the choice of threshold used to determine a positive prediction 
for an event is important.  If the costs of failing to predict a recession or banking crisis are high, 
then the threshold for should be set low in order to avoid missing a crisis.  However, if the 
threshold is set too low the model may regularly predict a crisis or recession.  If the costs to 
over-predicting recessions or crises is high (perhaps because the public ignores warnings of 
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past), then the threshold for calling a crisis should be set very high.  Thus the appropriate choice 
of these depends on the loss function of the policymaker.   
 
7  Conclusions 
 
We have found strong evidence for interdependency between recessions and banking crises 
using both non-parametric tests and unconditional bivariate probit models.  Using data for a 
selection of OECD countries since 1981, we find that banking sector capital ratios, the deviation 
of the credit-to-GDP ratio from trend and the current account deficit are useful predictors of 
banking crises.  We also find that the first principal component derived from OECD leading 
indicators of GDP growth helps predict recessions, as do movements in real house and equity 
price inflation, and the current account deficit.  Once these exogenous variables are included we 
find that the observed interdependence between banking crises and recessions disappears – 
indicating that the observed interdependence is a result of common causes rather than direct 
causal links. 
 
Our preferred models are, like all forecasting models, prone to mistakes.  For commonly used 
thresholds to determine a positive prediction they tend to over-predict recessions and banking 
crises.  Their out-of-sample performance (post-2005) is substantially better, but this indicates 
how unusual the past few years are, and is consistent with stability tests which suggest some 
model coefficients changed after 2005 (possibly reflecting the fact that increased global 
financial inter-linkages increased the risk of banking crises in all countries through contagion).  
Even though the precise model predictions are imperfect, the models do still provide 
policymakers with useful information.  For example, our model points to the increased risk of a 
banking crisis in the United Kingdom in the mid-to-late 2000s, and it also corroborates the risk 
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Appendix 1: Initial bivariate probit model of banking crises and recessions with all lags of 
exogenous variables. 
   Coefficient Standard error zP > | z |  
Banking crises 
Banking crisist-1 -7.02 8.32x10
4 0.00 1.00
Recessiont-1 0.60 0.62 0.96  0.34
First principal componentt-1 0.15 0.15 1.03 0.30
Liquidityt-1 -2.09 5.10 -0.41  0.68
Capitalt-1 -0.05 0.11 -0.43  0.67
Real house price inflationt-1 -0.04 0.03 -1.63 0.10
Real equity price inflationt-1 0.00 0.01 -0.09 0.93
Credit to GDP ratio gapt-1 0.21 0.07 3.19  0.00
Current account as % GDPt-1 -0.18 0.10 -1.79  0.07
Country dummies 
Canada 2.99 93.01 0.03  0.97
Denmark 3.03 93.02 0.03  0.97
Finland 3.76 93.02 0.04  0.97
France 4.28 93.01 0.05  0.96
Germany -1.29 1.20 x10
4 0.00 1.00
Italy 4.48 93.01 0.05  0.96
Japan 4.82 93.01 0.05  0.96
Netherlands -2.74 5.16  x10
6 0.00 1.00
Norway 4.19 93.01 0.05  0.96
Spain -2.31 5.38 x10
4 0.00 1.00
Sweden 3.82 93.01 0.04  0.97
UK 4.53 93.01 0.05  0.96
US 3.83 93.01 0.04  0.97
Constant -5.56 93.02 -0.06  0.95
Recession 
Banking crisist-1 -0.10 0.78 -0.13  0.90
Recessiont-1 -1.02 0.46 -2.24  0.03
First principal componentt-1 -0.43 0.14 -2.99 0.00
Liquidityt-1 -5.36 3.72 -1.44  0.15
Capitalt-1 0.10 0.14 0.75  0.46
Real house price inflationt-1 -0.08 0.03 -2.64 0.01
Real equity price inflationt-1 -0.03 0.01 -2.27 0.02
Credit to GDP ratio gapt-1 0.07 0.05 1.22  0.22
Current account as % GDPt-1 -0.19 0.06 -2.96  0.00
Country dummies 
Canada -2.63 1.15 -2.28  0.02
Denmark -1.29 1.04 -1.23  0.22
Finland -1.86 1.14 -1.64  0.10
France -1.31 0.88 -1.50  0.13
Germany -0.23 0.68 -0.34  0.73
Italy -0.89 0.88 -1.01  0.31
Japan 0.27 0.73 0.38  0.71
Netherlands -0.84 0.91 -0.93  0.36
Norway -0.76 0.80 -0.94  0.35
Spain -1.52 1.06 -1.43  0.15
Sweden -0.34 0.82 -0.42  0.68
UK -1.32 0.96 -1.38  0.17
US -1.11 0.94 -1.18  0.24
Constant -0.78 1.06 -0.74  0.46
ρ -1.00 0.00 0.31
Number of observations:  347 Log likelihood:  -83.795369
(7)   
                                                 
(7) Note that problems with near-collinearity of some variables (notably lagged dependent variables and country 
dummies) meant that some variables had to be excluded from early stages of the estimation process.  These were 
added into the model after an initial process of elimination for the exogenous variables and the process of  
 
External MPC Unit Discussion Paper No. 33 September 2011 23
 
Appendix 2: Bivariate probit model of systemic banking crises and recessions including 
proportion of sample countries in recession 
 
   Coefficient  Standard error  z  P>|z| 
Banking crises 
Credit to GDP ratio gapt-1 0.11 0.05 2.30  0.02
Constant -2.35 0.23 -10.43  0.00
Recession 
First principal componentt-1 -0.18 0.11 -1.56  0.12
Real house price inflationt-1 -0.06 0.03 -2.00  0.05
Real equity price inflationt-1 -0.03 0.01 -2.77  0.01
Current account as % GDPt-1 -0.10 0.06 -1.76  0.08
Proportion of sample in 
recessiont 3.72 0.76 4.91  0.00
Constant -2.52 0.31 -8.17  0.00
ρ -0.353 0.491 0.83
Number of observations:  347 Log likelihood:  -65.97
 
                                                                                                                                                            
elimination was restarted (adding in previously eliminated exogenous variables one at time to check they were still 
insignificant).  
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